Counting the Cost: Football's Financial Feasibility
When the idea of elevating football at GMU from club level to NCAA Division I status gained momentum in the 1990s, the financial hurdles quickly became the most formidable barrier. A close look at the university’s internal financial forecasts reveals that starting and sustaining a varsity football program would require large, recurring expenditures and likely impose high costs on the university and its students.
One source, Net Cost of Adding Football, details early estimates of the startup and maintenance costs associated with a full Division I-level program. These estimates included not only the team’s operating expenses (scholarships, coaching staff salaries, travel, equipment) but also the investment in Title IX programs and the substantial investment needed to upgrade or build proper athletic facilities. With existing infrastructure deemed inadequate for high-level collegiate football, the university would have needed significantly expanded stadiums and support facilities before even playing the first official game.
Further financial analysis, referenced in another document, Football Issue in Question, modeled the ongoing costs and projected revenue streams. According to the estimates, annual operating costs could reach several million dollars per year. At the same time, anticipated revenues, from ticket sales, donations, sponsorships, or other sources, were projected to be modest. The projected income was not sufficient to offset expenses, meaning that a football program would run at a substantial deficit each year unless subsidized by outside funds or additional student fees
A third item, BOV Postponed decision on football, centers on the question of who would bear the financial burden. The university considered raising student fees to support the program, a plan that would distribute the cost among the broader student body rather than rely entirely on alumni donations or external revenue. But that in itself posed a problem: many students were supportive of football in theory, yet fewer were willing to pay the additional fees required. The gap between support and willingness to pay underscored a critical weakness in the financial model; a willingness to cheer for football doesn’t always translate into financial backing.
At the time the issue was debated, the president warned that establishing football would need a “major commitment of private financial support … and a detailed five- to 10-year financial plan.” A task force analyzing the proposal estimated annual costs around US$4 million. These numbers included not only scholarships and team operating costs, but also the necessary addition of women’s sports to maintain gender equity under federal law. Even building a suitable stadium was projected to cost several million more.
Because the expected revenue from ticket sales and other income sources was relatively small (only a fraction of annual spending), the burden would fall mainly to the university budget or student fees, making football a potentially long-term financial liability rather than a self-sustaining program.
In short, the financial case for adding football at GMU was weighed heavily in favor of caution. The projected costs, from facility expansion to annual maintenance, far exceeded the likely returns. The challenge of funding a program that offered cultural or school spirit benefits, but little financial upside, made football a risky proposition. That risk, more than student enthusiasm or outsider pressure, appears to have been decisive in the decision to decline varsity football at Mason.